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reated by SB 37 (Maddy) (Chapter 12, Statutes of
1993), the Bureau of State Audits (BSA) is an audit-
ing and investigative gency w ich operates und r the
administrative oversight of the Milton Marks Commission
on California State Government Organization and Economy
(also known as the "Little Hoover Commission"). In Gov-
ernment Code section 8543 et seq., SB 37 delegates to BSA
most of the duties previously performed by the Auditor
General's Office, such as examining and reporting annually
upon the financial statements prepared by the executive branch
of the state, performing other related assignments (such as
performance audits) that are mandated by statute, and admin-
istering the California Whistleblower Protection Act, Gov-
ernment Code section 8547 et seq. BSA is also required to
conduct audits of state and local government requested by
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee (JLAC) to the extent
that funding is available. BSA is headed by the State Auditor,
appointed by the Governor to a four-year term from a list of
three qualified individuals submitted by the JLAC.
MAJOR PROJECTS
PUC Failed to Manage Contract
to Investigate 1998 PG&E Blackout
In Public Utilities Commission: Did Not Effectively
Manage Its Contract for Investigating San Francisco's
December 1998 Power Failure (May 1999), BSA criticized
the Public Utilities Commission (PUC) for failing to prop-
erly manage a contract to investigate a massive power outage
on December 8, 1998 in the San Francisco Bay Area. The
blackout, which was caused by a
system disturbance at a Pacific BSA noted that th
Gas & Electric (PG&E) substa- confusion among th
tion, left more than one million ducting investigation
people in the Bay Area without
electricity for a full day. The PUC
ordered both PG&E and its own staff to conduct an investi-
gation; in addition, the California Independent System Op-
erator (ISO) and the San Francisco City Attorney's Office
also conducted investigations. Because it did not have ad-
equate technical expertise to explore the causes of the outage
and to recommend methods for preventing a recurrence, the
PUC awarded a $400,000 contract to an outside consulting
firm (consultant) that would conduct the investigation. The
contract required the consultant to draw expert conclusions
and prepare a report suitable for litigation purposes related to
the power failure.
Preliminarily, BSA noted that there was jurisdictional
confusion among the various entities conducting investiga-
tions. The ISO was created in 1996 as part of the state's
er
S.
restructuring of the electricity industry;
the ISO now controls electricity trans-
mission, and the PUC has retained jurisdiction over distri-
bution. Statutes direct the ISO to review each major outage
and determine the cause, evaluate the utility's response time
and effectiveness, and assess whether the owner's or
operator's practices enhanced or undermined the facility's
ability to restore service efficiently. The December 1998
PG&E outage, which was the first major blackout since the
legislature restructured the state's public utilities, was caused
by problems within the transmission system that ultimately
affected the distribution system, and BSA found that "the
lines of jurisdiction between ISO and the Commission be-
came unclear."
BSA concluded that the PUC had a reasonable basis for
hiring the consultant to conduct its investigation. However,
BSA found that the PUC provided inadequate oversight of
the contract. The Commission is unable to demonstrate that
it evaluated the qualifications of the consultant's subcontrac-
tors, or that it even gave the consultant written permission to
hire subcontractors (as required by the contract). The Com-
mission also did not make certain that the consultant's report
contained sufficient detail and analysis to support all of the
conclusions in the report, which will undoubtedly be used in
litigation. For example, the report has invited criticism be-
cause it concludes that "PG&E has an error prone work cul-
ture that tends to bypass procedures and work practice re-
quirements." However, the report does not specify the meth-
odology or detailed analysis that the consultant used to arrive
at this conclusion. The PUC has agreed to pay an additional
amount so that the consultant,
e was jurisdictional which should have submitted a
various entities con- complete analysis, can provide
further support for the report's
conclusions. Additionally, the
PUC based the contract amount
on broad estimates that it cannot substantiate, and did not
require the consultant to submit invoices so that the Com-
mission could ensure that expenditures for the investigation
were appropriate and within the contract's budgeted amounts.
Ultimately, BSA recommended that the PUC and ISO
develop formal investigation protocols to eliminate jurisdic-
tional confusion, and that the Commission conduct another
review of the investigative report before paying the consult-
ant, to ensure the report complies with the contract's specifi-
cations. BSA noted that it will look further into the
Commission's contract management program to assess
whether the problems with this contract are unique or whether
they reflect systemic weaknesses throughout the Commission
(see agency report on PUC for related discussion).
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BSA Critiques California's
Child Support Enforcement Program
In Child Support Enforcement Program: Without Stron-
ger Leadership, California's Child Support Program Will
Continue to Struggle (August 1999), BSA evaluated the
performance of the Department of Social Services (DSS) in
supervising California's Child Support Enforcement Program
(CSEP), and found that the program is "disjointed, compli-
cated, and lacking in leadership." Although no single entity
is wholly responsible for the program's failures, state, county,
and federal CSEP administrators have all contributed to its
often inadequate performance. As the designated statewide
supervisor of California's CSEP, DSS is responsible for pro-
viding leadership, assistance, and direction to the county dis-
trict attorneys who administer the program locally. Yet, ac-
cording to BSA, "DSS has consistently failed in this role."
One of DSS' most critical failures has been in the area of
automation. Under 1988 federal law, California was required
to set up a fully operational automated statewide child sup-
port enforcement system by October 1, 1995; failure to com-
ply with this provision would eventually result in the loss of
federal funding for welfare and child support programs. In an
effort to comply with this requirement, DSS undertook the
development and implementation of the Statewide Automated
Child Support System (SACSS) in the early 1990s. Califor-
nia spent nearly five years designing, developing, piloting,
and implementing SACSS in 23 counties. However, after
spending more than $111 in taxpayer dollars, DSS declared
SACSS a failure in November 1997. In 1998, DSS made an-
other attempt to comply with the federal requirement by be-
ginning to develop a "consortium" of selected systems from
four counties; however, the federal government rejected the
consortium plan in April 1999, and reiterated its requirement
that California develop a single, statewide system. Accord-
ing to BSA, "[n]ot only does [CSEP] currently limp along
under a failed statewide auto-
mated system, but many counties
that are struggling to collect child BSA evaluated the
support have not received needed Department of Socia
technical assistance. Rather than California's Child
monitoring and providing guid- Program (CSEP), and
ance to these counties, DSS has is "disjointed, comp
instead focused its attention on ad- leadership"
ministrative processes, reviewing
the counties only to ensure that they are complying with cer-
tain federal regulations. Moreover, in its role of statewide
supervisor, DSS has seen itself simply as a conduit of federal
data and a reporter of information that it does not analyze or
validate. As a result of this laissez-faire attitude, the state's
CSEP lacks any sense of overarching vision."
In addition, by not providing more leadership and guid-
ance, DSS has allowed county district attorneys broad dis-
cretion in operating their child support programs. As a result,
although some counties have implemented innovative pro-
cesses and have dedicated considerable resources to their pro-
grams, others have become backlogged and have failed to
deliver even basic services to local families. Furthermore, in
the absence of active supervision, different counties have
developed different child support philosophies. Some district
attorneys view noncustodial parents who do not pay child
support as criminals, while others enlist a more social ap-
proach. Simply based on where they live in California, one
noncustodial parent may be prosecuted, while another is edu-
cated about his/her responsibilities and assisted in fulfilling
them. BSA noted that this disparate delivery of services is
unfair to the families who rely on the CSEP.
To exacerbate these problems further, the federal gov-
ernment has contributed to the program's dysfunction by of-
fering incentives that may motivate misguided efforts. For
example, the current federal incentive structure does not con-
sider certain demographic factors that can affect a state's CSEP
performance. Therefore, states like California may be penal-
ized because of factors like high unemployment. Addition-
ally, even though the focus of the national program has
changed in recent years, the incentive structure only partially
reflects these changes and may send the wrong message to
the states.
Because critics of California's CSEP often fail to take
into account demographics that influence its performance,
BSA considered such factors in its analysis of the state's per-
formance. According to BSA, however, "even when one ac-
counts for California's demographic disadvantage in compari-
son to many other states, it is still clear that the state's CSEP
is not only ineffective but, in fact, is floundering. With recent
welfare reform causing more and more families to rely on
child support, California's failure to improve its CSEP is di-
rectly affecting the lives of children in the state."
With a number of proposals to remove the CSEP from
DSS then pending in the legislature, BSA made a number of
recommendations, including the following: (1) wherever the
Governor and legislature ulti-
mately place the responsibility for
'erformance of the California's CSEP, they should
ervices in supervising appoint to leadership positions
ptht he ormt only qualified individuals capable
und that the program of providing the authority, moti-
vation, direction, and effective
oversight needed to significantly
improve the program; (2) to im-
prove the effectiveness of the CSEP, DSS needs to show stron-
ger leadership by developing a strategic plan that has mean-
ingful goals and performance measures, fully implementing
its new programs and initiative, reviewing county operations
to provide technical assistance to poor performers, ensuring
that it collects and reports accurate data, and communicating
program policy to counties in a clear and timely fashion; (3)
to ensure that California residents participating in the CSEP
are treated equally and receive the same level of service from
county to county, DSS should exercise its authority over







county-run programs to achieve uniform delivery of child sup-
port services at the local level; (4) in addition, DSS should
study the best practices of county-run child support programs,
and then consider the merit of implementing these practices
statewide; (5) finally, the California legislature should monitor
the federal government's efforts to improve its incentive struc-
ture to ensure that such modifications match the current direc-
tion of the federal child support enforcement program, take
into account demographic factors in determining a state's per-
formance, and memorialize Congress if changes are needed.
Subsequent to the issuance of BSA's report, the legisla-
ture enacted and the Governor signed a package of bills which
will completely restructure California's CSEP. AB 196
(Kuehl) (Chapter 478, Statutes of 1999) removes the CSEP
from DSS and creates a new Department of Child Support
Services to oversee a centralized statewide system of child
support enforcement and collection, with uniform forms and
procedures at local county child
support offices; the system is no Subsequent to the is:
longer under local district attor- the legislature enac
ney jurisdiction. Additionally, AB signed a package of bi
472 (Aroner) (Chapter 803, Stat- restructure Californi
utes of 1999) creates a Child Sup-
port Consumer Complaint Fair
Hearings Process for both custodial and noncustodial parents,
that will exist outside the more cumbersome and time-con-
suming court process; and AB 150 (Aroner) (Chapter 479,
Statutes of 1999) requires the Franchise Tax Board to take
over the creation and implementation of a single automated
computer system for the new CSEP.
CalTrans' Failures Caused Waste of
Millions of Dollars on Century Freeway
In Department of Transportation: Disregarding Early
Warnings Has Caused Millions of Dollars to Be Spent Cor-
recting Century Freeway Design Flaws (August 1999), BSA
faulted the California Department of Transportation
(CalTrans) for ignoring early warning signs regarding its de-
sign of the Century Freeway in Los Angeles County and caus-
ing the subsequent waste of millions of taxpayer dollars.
After nearly thirty years of controversy, court injunctions,
and delays, CalTrans opened the Century Freeway in Octo-
ber 1993. In March 1995, problems again arose for the free-
way when, less than two years after the opening, CalTrans
discovered cracking and sunken sections in the shoulder ar-
eas of the freeway that it had constructed below ground level.
Although it originally thought the problems involved main-
tenance issues, by January 1996 CalTrans became aware that
matters were far worse: It had not designed the lowered sec-
tion of the freeway to compensate sufficiently for the effects
of rising groundwater beneath the pavement.
BSA found that, during the planning, design, and con-
struction phases for the Century Freeway, CalTrans disre-
garded warning signs that could have prevented the design
flaws in the freeway's 3.5-mile lowered section. Most sig-
nificantly, CalTrans disregarded the 1968 recommendation
of its staff to test extensively the soils and the groundwater
levels in the area planned for the lowered section, even when
it designed the modified storm-drain system for the freeway
in 1973. Further, in late 1981, CalTrans agreed to extend the
length of the lowered section of the freeway west toward the
Los Angeles River, and the Department apparently designed
this extension without adequate research and consideration,
such as additional testing of the soil and groundwater condi-
tions in the area. If CalTrans had performed these tests, it
could have realized the rising groundwater would threaten
the freeway as designed, and it could have taken appropriate
steps early in the project.
CalTrans has documents from 1987 showing that ground-
water levels had risen substantially between 1985 and 1987 in
the area planned for the below-ground-level section of the free-
way. However, because this analysis was for determining bridge
foundations, it was not sent to the
nce of BSA's report, district unit desi gning the low-
d and the Governor ered section. During construction
of the drain system for the loweredCSEP. section in July 1990, CalTrans in-
stalled four dewatering wells be-
cause it was encountering a lot of
water. The ground was so wet that CalTrans halted construc-
tion for more than six weeks. Another six years passed before
CalTrans realized it had a serious groundwater problem.
While CalTrans was struggling to move forward with the
Century Freeway project, another agency was taking action
that was to have important consequences for the freeway. The
freeway crosses over two groundwater basins. By the 1950s,
the groundwater of these basins had been overpumped, re-
ducing available groundwater supplies while demand for
groundwater was increasing. As part of the effort to restore
the health of the groundwater basins, a water replenishment
district was established in 1959 to return water to the basins.
By early 1997, the groundwater levels had increased over 30
feet. Although the groundwater replenishment involves all
the geological layers, those layers closest to the surface, which
are about 25 feet below grade, are the ones affecting the low-
ered section of the Century Freeway.
CalTrans may have pushed ahead without further ana-
lyzing groundwater conditions because it was under some
pressure to begin construction of the freeway after the 1981
lifting of a court injunction that had halted progress for many
years. To qualify for federal highway funding for this project,
CalTrans had to meet certain construction deadlines.
In January 1996, once CalTrans acknowledged that the
cracking and sinking were more than ongoing maintenance
problems, it spent $22 million in emergency repairs and
planned to use another $45 million for permanent repairs to
the drainage system. CalTrans engaged both in-house engi-
neers and outside consultants from academia and private prac-
tice to evaluate the underlying causes of the problems and
develop options to resolve them.






Although it is working to remedy the situation, CalTrans
must still determine what it will do with the groundwater it
pumps from beneath the freeway. As of May 1999, CalTrans
had paid, under protest, more than $370,000 in taxes to pump
out the groundwater. The Department is currently diverting
the water into the Los Angeles and San Gabriel rivers; thus,
the water is not available for other uses. CalTrans is, on the
other hand, reviewing proposals with two local cities to find
beneficial uses for the extracted water so that it does not waste
the water or undermine the efforts of the local water replen-
ishment district. Because CalTrans has not determined the
best resolution to the groundwater disposal problem, it has
no firm estimates of the costs related to the reuse of the ex-
tracted water. However, preliminary estimates suggest that
the additional costs could be more than $50 million for initial
costs and from $370,000 to $5 million in annual costs.
In responding to concerns that CalTrans withheld infor-
mation about the problems it was experiencing on the Cen-
tury Freeway, CalTrans acknowledged it could have done
more to inform the legislature. However, CalTrans did in-
clude some information related to the Century Freeway prob-
lems in its normal communications with local legislators, the
public, and the California Transportation Commission.
Since the groundwater problems became apparent,
CalTrans has reassessed some of its policies and procedures
and convened an in-house review of the circumstances lead-
ing to the problems at the lowered section of the Century
Freeway. The review panel made numerous recommendations
for new or revised procedures and most units have responded
appropriately. However, CalTrans has not monitored some
units, which were slow to implement changes.
BSA made a number of recommendations, including the
following: (1) CalTrans should inform the legislature, through
its Senate and Assembly Transportation committees, as well as
the California Transportation Commission about its progress
in determining an environmentally sound and cost-effective
method for reusing the groundwater pumped from under the
Century Freeway; (2) CalTrans should continue working with
the Water Replenishment District of Southern California to
coordinate actions so that neither agency jeopardizes the other's
efforts to fulfill its organizational mission; and (3) to ensure
that it properly puts into practice the recommendations from
special in-house staff reports, CalTrans should ensure that the
unit designated to implement these recommendations periodi-
cally reports its progress to Department management.
Other Reports
BSA also issued the following reports between May I
and October 31, 1999: The State's Use of Funds to Adminis-
ter Other Programs Reduced ItsAbility to Provide Effective
Administration and Leadership (Report No. 98124; May
1999); State of California: Treasurer's Cash Count as of
December 31, 1998 (Report No. 99005; June 1999); State of
California: Statement of Securities Accountability of the
State Treasurer's Office December 31, 1998 (Report No.
99008; June 1999); State of California: Internal Control and
State and Federal Compliance Audit Report for the Fiscal
Year Ended June 30, 1998 (Report No. 98002; June 1999);
State Board of Equalization: Its Tax Settlement Program
Continues to Have Merit (Report No. 98017.1; July 1999);
Franchise Tax Board: Its Tax Settlement Program Remains
an Important Alternative for Dispute Resolution (Report
No. 98017.2; July 1999); Department of Toxic Substances
Control: The Generator Fee Structure Is Unfair, Recycling
Efforts Require Improvement, and State and Local Agen-
cies Need to Fully Implement the Unified Program (Report
No. 98027; July 1999); Overtime for State Employees: Some
Departments Have Paid Too Much in Overtime Costs (Re-
port No. 99001.1; July 1999); Department of Health Ser-
vices: Despite Shortcomings in the Department's Monitor-
ing Efforts, Limited Data Suggest Its Two-Plan Model Does
Not Adversely Affect Quality of and Access to Health Care
(Report No. 99102; July 1999); Lax Monitoring Led to Pay-
ment of Unsubstantiated Adult Education Claims and
Changes in the Program May Seriously Impact Its Effec-
tiveness (Report No. 98113; July 1999); Department of
Health Services: The Forensic Alcohol Program Needs to
Reevaluate Its Regulatory Efforts (Report No. 97025. 1;
August 1999); School Safety: Comprehensive Resolution
Programs Help Prepare Schools for Conflict (Report No.
99107; August 1999); Investigations of Improper Activities
by State Employees: February through June 1999 (Report
No. 199-2; August 1999); California Science Center: It Does
Not Ensure Fair and Equitable Treatment of Employees,
Thus Exposing the State to Risk (Report No. 98115.1; Au-
gust 1999); Department of General Services: The Califor-
nia Multiple Award Schedules Program Has Merit but Does
Not Ensure That the State Gets the Best Value for Its Pur-
chases (Report No. 99500; August 1999); UCSF Stanford
Health Care: The New Entity Has Not Yet ProducedAntici-
pated Benefits and Faces Significant Challenges (Report
No. 99128; August 1999); In-Home Supportive Services:
Since Recent Legislation Changes the Way Counties Will
Administer the Program, The Department of Social Services
Needs to Monitor Service Delivery (Report No. 96036; Sep-
tember 1999); Department of Transportation: Seismic Ret-
rofit Expenditures Are Generally in Compliance With the
Bond Act (Report No. 99022; October 1999); Wasco State
Prison: Its Failure to Proactively Address Problems in Criti-
cal Equipment, Emergency Procedures, and Staff Vigilance
Raises Concerns About Institutional Safety and Security
(Report No. 99118; October 1999); Department of Develop-
mental Services: Without Sufficient State Funding, It Can-
not Furnish Optimal Services to Developmentally Disabled
Adults (Report No. 99112; October 1999); Department of
Health Services: Although It Has Not Withheld Informa-
tion Inappropriately, the Department Should Make Research
Findings More Widely Available (Report No. 99106; Octo-
ber 1999); and The Los Angeles Unified School District: It
Made Reasonable Decisions in Moving Its Business Ser-
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vices Center, but Must Act Soon to Successfully Relocate to
a Permanent Site (Report No. 99114; October 1999).
LEGISLATION
SB 951 (Hayden). The Reporting of Improper Govern-
mental Activities Act provides protections to state employ-
ees who report improper governmental activities. Under the
Act, the State Auditor is authorized to conduct an investiga-
tive audit upon receiving confirmation that an employee or
state agency has engaged in an improper governmental activ-
ity. A state employee, including a University of California
employee, is prohibited from using his/her official authority
or influence to intimidate, threaten, coerce, or command a
person in order to interfere with the right of that person to
make a disclosure under the Act.
As amended August 30, this bill renames the Act as the
"California Whistleblower Protection Act," and more closely
aligns California's "whistleblower" statutes with existing fed-
eral law. The bill expands the protection afforded to persons
who either make a protected disclosure (defined as a disclo-
sure to anyone of information that may evidence an improper
governmental activity or evidence any condition that may sig-
nificantly threaten the health or safety of employees or the
public if the disclosure is made for the purpose of remedying
the condition) or refuse to obey an illegal order (defined as
any directive to violate or assist in violating a federal, state,
or local law, rule, regulation, or order to work (or cause oth-
ers to work) in unhealthy or unsafe conditions). The bill also
provides that nothing in the bill is intended to supersede or
limit the right to make a privileged publication in an official
proceeding with regard to information provided under the Act.
Governor Davis signed SB 951 on October 6 (Chapter 673,
Statutes of 1999).
SB 144 (Schiff and Hertzberg), as amended July 13,
authorizes the State Bar of California to require its members
to pay annual licensing fees during 2000. To remedy a num-
ber of recent problems at the Bar, the bill prohibits the Bar
from engaging in certain activities; requires the Bar to con-
tract with an independent firm to audit its financial statements
for each fiscal year beginning after December 31, 1998; and
requires the Bar to contract with BSA for a performance au-
dit of its operations from July 1, 2000, to December 31, 2000,
inclusive. Commencing with January 1, 2002, through De-
cember 31, 2002, the Bar must contract with BSA to conduct
a performance audit of its operations for the respective fiscal
year every two years thereafter (see agency report on STATE
BAR for related discussion). SB 144 was signed by the Gov-
ernor on September 7 (Chapter 342, Statutes of 1999).
AB 644 (Wildman), as amended in August 1999, is no
longer relevant to BSA.
Little Hoover Commission
Executive Director: James P. Mayer # (916) 445-2125 * Internet: www.lhc.ca.gov/lhc.html
he Little Hoover Commission (LHC), more formally
known as the Milton Marks Commission on Califor-
nia Stat  G vernment Organization and Economy, was
created by the legislature in 1961 and became operational in
the spring of 1962 (Government Code section 8501 et seq.).
Although considered to be within the executive branch of state
government for budgetary purposes, state law provides that
the Commission "shall not be subject to the control or direc-
tion of any officer or employee of the executive branch ex-
cept in connection with the appropriation of funds approved
by the Legislature" (Government Code section 8502).
The Commission's enabling act provides that no more
than seven of its thirteen members may be from the same
political party. The Governor appoints five citizen members,
and the legislature appoints four citizen members. The bal-
ance of the membership is comprised of two Senators and
two Assemblymembers. This unique formulation enables LHC
to be California's only truly independent watchdog agency.
However, in spite of its statutory independence, the Com-
mission remains a purely advisory entity only empowered to
make recommendations.
The Commission's purposes are to promote economy,
efficiency, and improved service in the transaction of public
-7kl\\ "
business in the various departments, agen-
cies, and instrumentalities of the executive
branch of the state government; and to
make the operation of state departments, agencies, and in-
strumentalities and all expenditures of public funds more di-
rectly responsive to the wishes of the people.
The Commission seeks to achieve these ends by con-
ducting studies and making recommendations as to the adop-
tion of methods and procedures to reduce government ex-
penditures, the elimination of functional and service duplica-
tion, the abolition of unnecessary services and functions, the
definition or redefinition of public officials' duties and re-
sponsibilities, and the reorganization or restructuring of state
entities and programs. The Commission holds hearings about
once a month on topics that come to its attention from citi-
zens, legislators, and other sources.
In 1993, LHC was renamed in honor of former Senator
Milton Marks, who authored the legislation originally creat-
ing the Commission.
At this writing, LHC's commissioners are Chair Richard
R. Terzian, Vice-Chair Michael E. Alpert, Assemblymember
Bill Campbell, Carl D. Covitz, Daniel W. Hancock, Assem-
blymember Sally Havice, Gary H. Hunt, Gwen Moore, Angie
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